2 answering why-questions
How to answer a why-question? For example, let NoFTL be the statement "No observer can move faster than light," which is one of the several astonishing predictions of relativity. As it is a statement that hard to believe, it is natural to ask why we think it is true. The standard answers to the question "Why NoFTL?" are 1. "NoFTL is true because the 4-dimensional Minkowski spacetime over R (the field of real numbers) is a good model of our physical world; and in this model NoFTL is valid."
"NoFTL is an axiom (of Special Relativity)."
Neither of these answers is satisfactory to a logician. The problem with the first is that it refers to one particular model and not to a list of axioms.
The second does not really answer the question, it is a kind of "just because"
answer.
How to give satisfactory answers to why-questions in physics? First of all to answer the question "Why P ?", we need a formal language in which we can formulate P and the possible answers to it. Let us fix one such language.
1
The possible answers to the question "Why P ?" are consistent theories which do not contain P as an axiom.
2 Here we do not require theories to be deductively closed systems, as we would like to separate the assumptions of the theory from its consequences. Hence we use the term theory as a 1 Every concept we introduce here is relative to a fixed language in which P can be formulated. 2 It is important that we restrict our definition to possible answers to why-questions in physics because, for example, in mathematics the possible answers to why-questions are usually proofs and not theories. See, e.g., [15] .
synonym for axiom system. Let us call a possible answer acceptable answer if it implies P .
To present some examples of acceptable answers to the question "Why
NoFTL?", let us consider the following two-sorted first-order language:
where Q is the sort of quantities and B is the sort of bodies; · and + are binary function symbols and < is a binary relation symbol of sort Q; IOb (inertial as "observer o coordinatizes body b at spacetime location x, y, z, t ," (that is, at space location x, y, z and at instant t).
In this language we can define the term speed o (b) as the speed of a body b according to observer o. Hence we can formulate that no observer can move faster than light. Moreover, we can prove the following:
where SpecRel is the consistent axiom system of the following axioms:
AxField: The quantity part Q; +, ·, < is an ordered field.
AxSelf: Every observer coordinatizes itself at a coordinate point if and only if its space component is the origin, that is, space location 0, 0, 0 .
AxPh: The speed of light signals is 1 according to every inertial observer.
AxEv: Every inertial observer coordinatizes the very same set of events.
3
AxSymd: Inertial observers agree as for the spatial distance between events if these events are simultaneous for both of them.
For the formulation of these concepts and axioms, see, e.g., [5] . So SpecRel is an acceptable answer to the question "Why NoFTL?", see [5, Thm.1] .
how to compare the different answers
How to get better and better answers to a certain why-question? The basic idea is that "the less it assumes, the better an answer is." Let us try to make this idea more precise by introducing the following concepts:
1. T h 2 is nonworse than T h 1 as an answer to the question "Why P ?" if all the formulas of T h 2 are consequences of T h 1 , that is, T h 1 implies ϕ 2 for any formula ϕ 2 ∈ T h 2 .
2. T h 2 is piecewise nonworse than T h 1 as an answer to the question "Why
It is easy to see the following:
1. Both concepts above are preorders on sets of formulas, that is, they are transitive and reflexive relations.
T h 2 is a piecewise nonworse answer than
3. T h 2 is a nonworse answer than T h 1 if it is piecewise nonworse.
Let us say that T h 2 is (piecewise) better than T h 1 if it is (piecewise) nonworse and nonequivalent according to the equivalence relation defined by the corresponding preorder.
These definitions fit in with the following idea of Michael Friedman [6] :
"Science increases our understanding of the world by reducing the total number of independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given."
To present another example, let us note that the following theorem can also be proved: Let us note that, according to the definition above, a theory consisting of two (nonequivalent) axioms is a piecewise better answer than a theory consisting of their conjunction. That is a nice property as it makes the introduction of the following concept possible. Let us say that a possible answer to the question "Why P ?" is pointless if there is a piecewise better answer which contains P as an axiom. Accordingly, the conjunction of Kepler's laws and Boyle's law is a pointless answer to the question "Why Kepler's laws are valid?". So it eliminates a problem that motivated Hempel to introduce his covering law model only for the explanation of particular events, see [7] .
general answers
In the previous section, we dealt with answers to one particular question.
However, in physics it is a general desire to search for unified theories, that is, theories answering more questions. So a good answer in physics is char-acterized by assuming little, but implying a lot.
3
The unification of theories is the point where we have to leave the convenience of fixed languages and search for suitable unification of the languages of the theories in question, too. For example, the juxtaposition of the axioms of relativity and quantum theories in their combined language will result in one theory but it will not solve the problem of their reconciliation. Though it will be consistent (as its parts are consistent) and will imply all the prediction of relativity and quantum theories, it will not be what we mean by a unified theory. To achieve a truly unified theory, we need a richer language in which we can formulate the interrelations between the concepts of these theories. However, unifying the languages in an appropriate way and formulating new axioms in this unified language to establish the interrelations between their concepts such that the unified theory has new experimentally testable predictions is a very difficult task. Unifying theories is the subject of amalgamating theories in algebraic logic, see, e.g., [10] .
the truth of axioms of physics
Most theories of why-questions require the explanations to be true, see, e.g., [7] . However, it is a fundamental requirement of a physical theory to be experimentally testable, hence refutable. So in physics we do not know whether an axiom is true or not, we just presume so. Therefore, if we require the explanations to be true, we will never ascertain whether our theory is really an explanation or not. Hence in the case of why-questions of physics, it is better not to require the axioms to be true.
For example, if we required the axioms of physics to be true, we could not say that Newton's theory is an explanation of Kepler's laws because Newton's theory is refuted by some experimental facts. 4 That would be inconvenient as Newton's theory is the standard example in the literature for explanation of Kepler's laws. Hence it is better to treat the axioms as possible truths and treat the matter only in conditional, that is, an answer to the question "Why P ?" means that "If the theory is true, then so is P ." In this sense it is still meaningful to say that Newton's theory explains Kepler's laws. And according to the above definition Newton's theory is an acceptable answer to the question "Why Kepler's laws are valid?".
some further examples
We can take the Twin Paradox (TwP) and ask "Why TwP?". In the language of SpecRel, we cannot formulate the full version of TwP only its inertial approximation called the Clock Paradox (ClP). Here we only concentrate on TwP but for similar investigation of ClP see [16] , [17] . To formulate the full version of TwP we have to extend the language above for accelerated (that is, non-inertial) observers, which is done by adding one more unary relation for accelerated observers on the sort of bodies. In this language we can formulate TwP, see [11] , [16] . Let us denote the formulated version of TwP as TwP.
The most natural axiom to assume about accelerated observers is the following:
AxCmv: At each moment of its world-line, every accelerated observer coordinatizes the nearby world for a short while in the same way as an inertial observer does.
For precise formulation of this axiom, see [11] , [16] . Let AccRel be the axiom system consisting of AxCmv and all the five axioms of SpecRel.
Surprisingly, AccRel does not answer the question "Why TwP?". Moreover, the following can be proved:
where Th(R) is the whole first-order theory of real numbers, see [11] . At first sight this result suggests that the question "Why TwP?" cannot be answered within first-order logic, which would be depressing as there are weighty methodological reasons for staying within first-order logic, see, e.g., [3] , [16] . However, there is a first-order axiom scheme (IND) in the above language such that AccRel together with this scheme answers the question "Why TwP?", see [11] , [16] .
The why-question "Why gravity slows time down?", can be answered by the theory AccRel ∪ IND and Einstein's equivalence principle, see [12] , [16] .
For further examples, let us consider the question of "Why does relativistic mass increase?" or "Why the sum of the rest masses of inelastically colliding inertial bodies is smaller than the rest mass of the originated inertial body?". Theories SpecRelDyn and SpecRelDyn + are possible answers to these questions, respectively, see [4] , [14] , [16] .
concluding remarks
In the spirit of reverse mathematics, we have introduced a precise definition of acceptable answers to why-questions in physics and some ideas about how to compare these answers. We also presented several examples mainly from axiomatic relativity. Finally let us note that the work done by the research group of Logic and Relativity led by Andréka Hajnal and István Németi can 8 be considered as providing explanations to why-questions of relativity, see references.
